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EDWARD F WAITE*
I.

JFJefferson and James Madison stepping directly from the enWE CAN

IMAGINE

Roger Williams, William Penn, Thomas

vironment in which they passed their lives into the United States
Supreme Court Chamber on May 3, 1943, what must have been
their emotions w-hen they found that the seeds of personal liberty
they had helped so effectively to plant in the new world had
grown into a tree which sheltered safely under its spreading
branches the group then engaging the attention of the Court!
For it was field-day for Jehovah's Witnesses. Thirteen cases involving their beliefs and activities were decided. In twelve the decisions were in their favor, and it was made plain that if the
thirteenth had been considered on the merits, it would have been
determined likewise. The general nature of these beliefs and activities are shown in a summary presented by Justice Jackson in a
dissenting opinion. So far as the facts are discussed in the seven
other opinions filed, nothing is found at variance with the fol-.
lowing statement in that opinion :
"From the record in the Douglas case we learn In 1939,
a 'Watch Tower Campaign' was instituted by Jehovah's Witnesses in Jeannette, Pennsylvania, an industrial city of some
16,000 inhabitants. Each home was visited, a bell was rung
or the door knocked upon, and the householder advised that
*Judge of the District Court for the Fourth District, Minnesota, 1911Retired.
'Douglas v. City of Jeannette, (1943) 319 U. S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877, 87
L. Ed. 1324, rehearing denied, (1943) 319 U. S. 782, 63 S. Ct. 1170, 87
L. Ed. 1726.
1941
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the Witness had important information. If the householder
would listen, a record was played on the phonograph. Its
subject was 'Snare and Racket.' The following words are
representative of its contents 'Religion is wrong and a snare
,because it deceives the people, but that does not mean that
all who follow religion are willingly bad. Religion is a racket
because it has long been used and is still used to extract
money from the people upon the theory and, promise that
the paying over of money to a priest will serve to relieve the
party paying from punishment after death and further insure
his salvation.' This line of attack is taken by the Witnesses
generally upon all denominations, especially the Roman Catholic. The householder was asked to buy a variety of literature
for a price or contribution. The price would be twenty-five
cents for the books and smaller sums for the pamphlets.
Oftentimes, if he was unwilling to purchase, the book or
pamphlet was given to him anyway
"When this campaign began, many complaints from offenided householders were received, and three or four of the
Witnesses were arrested. Thereafter, the 'zone servant' in
charge of the campaign conferred with the Mayor. He told the
Mayor it was their right to carry on the campaign and showed
him a decision of the United States Supreme Court, said to
have that effect, as proof of it. The Mayor told him that
they were at liberty to distribute their literature in the streets
of the city and that he would have no objection if they distributed the literature free of charge at the houses, but that
the people objected to their attempt to force these sales, and
particularly on Sunday The Mayor asked whether it would
not be possible to come on some other day and to distribute
the literature without selling it. The zone servant replied that
that was contrary to their method of 'doing business' and
refused. He also told the Mayor that he would bring enough
Witnesses into the City of Jeannette to get the job done
whether the Mayor liked it or not. The Mayor urged them to
await the outcome of an appeal which was then pending in
the other cases and let the matter take its course through the
courts. This, too, was refused, and the threat to bring more
people than the Mayor's police force could cope with was repeated.
"On Palm Sunday of 1939, the threat was made good.
The automobiles
Over 100 of the Witnesses appeared.
were parked outside the city limits, and headquarters were
set up in a gasoline station with telephone facilities through
which the director of the campaign could be notified wher
trouble occurred. He furnished bonds for the Witnesses as
they were arrested. As they began their work, around 9:00
o'clock in the morning, telephone calls began to come in to
the Police Headquarters, and coriplaints in large volume

DEBT TO JEHOVAH'S IVITNESSES

were made all. during the day. They exceeded the number
that the police could handle, and the Fire Department was
called out to assist. The W~itnesses called at homes singly
and in groups, and some of the homes complained that they
were called upon several times. Twenty-one Witnesses were
arrested. Only those were arrested where definite proof was
obtainable that the literature had been offered for sale or a
sale had been made for a price. Three were later discharged
for inadequacies in this proof, and eighteen were convicted.
"The literature thus distributed is voluminous and repetitious. Characterization is risky, but a few quotations will
indicate something of its temper.
"Taking as representative €the book 'Enemies,' of which
J. F Rutherford, the lawyer who long headed this group, is
the author, we find the following- 'The greatest racket ever
invented and practiced is that of religion. The most cruel
and seductive public enemy is that wiich employs religion
to carry on the racket. and by which means the people are
deceived and the name of Almighty God is reproached. There
are numerous systems of religion, but the most subtle, fraudulent and injurious to humankind is that which is generally
labeled the 'Christian religion,' because it has the appearance
of a worshipful devotion to the Supreme Being, and thereby
easily misleads many honest and sincere persons.'
It analyzes the income of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and announces that it is 'the great racket, a racket that is greater
than all other rackets combined!'
It also says under the
chapter heading 'Song of the Harlot'-'Referring now to
the foregoing Scriptural definition of harlot What religious
system exactly fits the prophecies recorded in God's Word?
There is but' one answer, and that is, The Roman Catholic
Church Organization.'
'Those close or nearby and dependent upon the main organization, being of the same
stripe, picture the Jewish and Protestant clergy and other
allies of the Hierarchy who tag along behind the Hierarchy
at the present time to do the bidding of the old 'wlhore.'
'Says the prophet of Jehovah- 'It shall come to pass in that
day, that Tyre (modern Tyre, the Roman Catholic Hierarchy organization) shall be forgotten.' Forgotten by whom?
By her former illicit paramours who have committed formcation with. her.' Throughout the literature statements of this
kind appear amidst scriptural comment and prophecy, denunciation of demonology, which is used to characterize the
Roman Catholic religion, criticism of government and those
in authority, advocacy of obedience to the law of God instead
of the law of man, and an interpretation of the law of God
as they see it.
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"In the Murdock case,2 on another Sunday morning of
the following Lent, we again find the Witnesses in Jeannette,
travelling by twos and threes and carrying cases for the books
and phonographs. This time eight were arrested, as against
the 21 arrested on the preceding Palm Sunday involved in
the Douglas case.
"In the Struthers case 3
we find the Witness knocking on the door of a total stranger at 4:00 on Sunday afternoon, July 7th. The householder's fourteen-year-old son answered, and, at the Witness's request, called his mother from
the kitchen. His mother had previously become 'very much
disgusted about going to the door' to receive leaflets, particularly since another person had on a previous occasion
called her to the door and told her, as she testified, 'that I
was doomed to go to hell because I would not let this literature in my home for my children to read.' She testified that
the \ Vitness 'shoved in the door' the circular being distributed, and that she 'couldn't do much more than take' it, and
she promptly tore it up in the presence of the Witness, for
while she believed 'in the worship of God,' she did not 'care
to talk to everybody' and did not 'believe that anyone needs
to be sent from door to door to tell us how to worship.'"
One who is not a Jehovah's Witness cannot decribe their peculiar beliefs in any way which would be satisfactory to them. For
the purposes of this article it is perhaps sufficient to say that
they are a religious group (although they themselves would object to the word "religious") which had its origin many years
ago in the activities of Charles Taze Russell. For a while they
were generally known as "Russellites," since 1931 they have been
"Jehovah's Witnesses." They adopted this name at a national
convention in that year Whatever we may think of their peculiar
tenets, there seems to be no reason to doubt the sincerity with
which, as a group, they hold and propagate them. They have
spread widely throughout the United States and some foreign
countries. They regard themselves as subjects of a Theocracy, of
which "Jehovah God" is the head, with Jesus Christ as his Son
and perfect representative. The present world is wholly under
the dominion of an evil spirit, Satan, whose rule will soon end
after fierce strife, called the Battle of Armageddon, between the
forces of good and the forces of evil,-Christ, in visible presence,
being the leader of the former They accept the scriptures of the
Old and New Testaments as their guide, interpreting them in
2

Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (1943)

63 S.3 Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292.

319 U. S. 105,

Martin v.City of Struthers, (1943) 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87
L. Ed. 1313.
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ways taught by their leaders, usually quite literal and often-as
they must seem to intelligent persons outside the fold-fantastic.
A paragraph from a resolution adopted at the 1931 convention
reads as follows
"As Jehovah's Witnesses our sole and only purpose is to
be entirely obedient to his commandments, to make known
that he is the only' true and almighty God, that his Word is
true and that his name is entitled to all honor and glory; that
Christ is God's King, whom he has placed upon his throne
of authority; that his kingdom is now come, and in- obedience to the Lord's commandments we must now declare
this good news as a testimony or witness to the nations and
to inform the rulers and the people of and concerning Satan's cruel and oppressive organization, and particularly with
reference to Christendom, which is the most wicked part of
that visible organization, and of and concerning God's purpose to shortly destroy Satan's organization, which great
act will be quickly followed by Christ the King's bringing to
the obedient peoples of earth peace and prosperity, liberty
and health, happiness and everlasting life, that God's kingdom is the hope of the world and there is no other, and that
this message must be delivered by those who are identified as
Jehovah's Witnesses."
Most of them, if-not all, reject any allegiance to earthly governments which is based on obligation. Their duty is deemed owing solely to the Theocracy, and their relations to what are commonly recognized as the obligations of citizenship are limited to
the payment of taxes (which they justify under the biblical injunction to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's")
and acquiescence in laws which they do not regard as "contrary
to the Word of God." They do not vote or hold public office, and
they persistently refuse to contribute directly or indirectly to
the present war effort. Apparently on the basis of expediency
rather than strict logic, they are recognized by the Selective Service
authorities as a "peace group," on a par with Friends (Quakers),
Mennonites and Brethren.
Except as appears in this inquiry the character and conduct
of the average Witness do not seem to differentiate him from
the average adherents to other religious groups in corresponding walks of life.
II.

Although the principles involved are or should be the same,
the path seems a long one from those applications of the doctrine
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of personal liberty which were in the minds of the framers of the
Bill of Rights and of the legislatures of the ratifying states, to the
applications made by our Supreme Court last May and June. Perhaps it will be interesting to trace it.
The protection of the First Amendment was originally limited
to infringement by Acts of Congress, 4 and the Court was very slow
to assert the right to interfere under the Fourteenth Amendment with the supremacy of the States in this field. The progress
made as late as 1907 is shown by the following language of Justice Holmes in Patterson v'. Colorado "r
"We leave undecided the. question whether there is to be
found in the 14th Amendment a prohibition similar to that in
the 1st. But even if we were to assume that freedom of
speech and freedom of the press were protected from abridgements not only on the part of the United States but also of
the states, still we should be far from the conclusion that the
plaintiff in error would have us reach. In the first place, the
main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon such publications as
had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not
prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare."
There was a vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan. It was
based on a view of the scope of the privileges and immunities
clause of the 14th amendment that had been decisively rejected
in the Slaughter House Cases which were among the earliest attempts by the Supreme Court to define the scope of that amendment. He asserted that that clause "necessarily prohibited the
States from impairing or abridging the constitutional rights of
such citizens (i.e., citizens of the United States) to free speech
and a free press." Some of his language seems prophetic of 1943,
as when he states
"But the court announces that it leaves undecided the
specific question whether there is to be found in the 14th
Amendment a prohibition as to the rights of free speech
and a free press similar to that in the 1st. It yet proceeds to
say that the main purpose of such constitutional provisions
was to prevent all such 'previous restraints' upon publications as had been practiced by other governments, but not
to prevent the subsequent punishment' of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare. I cannot assent to that
4Permoli v. New Orleans, (1845) 3 How. 589, 11 L. Ed. 739.
5(1907) 205 U. S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556, 51 L. Ed. 879.
6(1873) 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394. That view as to the scope of the
privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment still prevails.
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view, if it-be meant that the legislature may impair or abridge
the rights of a free press and free speech whenever it thinks
that the public welfare requires that it be done. The public
welfare cannot override constitutional privileges, and if the
rights of free speech and of a free press are, in their essence,
attributes of national citizenship, as I think they are, then
neither Congress nor any state, since the adoption of the 14th
Amendment, can by legislative enactments or judicial action
impair or abridge them."
The position that these rights are protected. against infringement by the state under the privilege and immunities clause of the
14th Amendment so firmly held and vigorously asserted by Mr.
Justice Harlan, has never been adopted by the Court. However,
Mr. Justice Harlan did in his dissent invoke the theory that "the
privileges of free speech and a free press, belonging to every citizen
of the United States, constitute essential parts of every man's liberty, and are protected against violation by that clause of the 14th
Amendment forbidding a state to 'deprive any person of his
liberty without due process of law." Here indeed did he foreshadow the course of subsequent developments. In the Gitlow
Case7 the defendant had been convicted of violating a New York
statute pumshing the advocacy of criminal anarchy. He expressly
invoked the protection of that part of the 14th Amendment referred to by Mr. Justice Harlan in the quotation last given from
his dissent in Patterson v. Colorado. While that provision was
held not to have been violated by the enforcement of the New
York statute under the circumstances present in the Gitlow Case,
the significant thing is that Mr. Justice Sanford, writing the
prevailing opinion, said that "For present purposes we may and
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are
protected by the 1st Amendment' from abridgement by Congressareamong the fundamental personal- rights and liberties protected
by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment from impairment by the states." This interpretation of the scope of that pro,ision has since been recognized in numerous decisions, and is
now settled law beyond dispute. The cases involving the numerous
activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses are points on the line that
defines the scope of the protection accorded these rights by the
due process dause 6f the 14th Amendment in the field where
freedom of expression and disseminating ideas is employed as a
means for propagating religion.
-Gitlow v. New York, (1925) 268 U. S. 652,45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138.
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III.
Of the fundamental rights that are specifically safeguarded by
the Constitution against both federal and state encroachment, the
Jehovah's Witnesses have freely invoked but four whenever their
conduct has been challenged. In recent years a great number of
cases to which they were parties, and which involved questions of
liberty of religion, speech, press and assembly, have found their
way into the supreme courts of many states and numerous federal
courts. More than a score have gone to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and to such this inquiry will be limited. The
governments which they will not directly support in any way
other than by the payment of taxes have given exhaustive attention to what they have claimed to be their constitutional rights as
against state laws or local ordinances which they refused to obey
The principles involved in such exercise of these freedoms as
may get before a court are identical. One may of course hold
any religious view he chooses without lawful interference. It is
only when he expresses his religion in ways which may concern
other people that he can come into conflict with the law, and this
is true with respect to speech of any sort, oral or printed. As
we search for rules laid down by the court in this field we should
bear in mind that so far as applicable they cover all the guaranteed
personal liberties, whichever one of them happens to be in question in the instant case. It is obvious that these liberties must have
limits, unrestricted license under the.guise of "freedom" of any
sort would of course be intolerable. What are the limits?
IV
8

Reynolds v U S. was the first of a number of cases in which
arose the question whether religious belief was a defense in a
prosecution of a Mormon for bigamy The Court held that it was
not. Speaking of the 1st Amendment it is said
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but it was left free to reach actions which were
in violation of social duties or subversive of good order
To permit this [i.e. plural marriages] would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in
name under such circumstances."
8(1878) 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244.
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In Davis v. Beason,9 also a case involving polygamy, the Court
said.
"The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose.
The First Amendment to the Constitution
was intended
to allow everyone under the jurisdiction of the United States
to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker
and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such
form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to
the equal rights of others.
It was never intended or supposed that the Amendment could be invoked as a protection,
against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the
peace, good order and morals of sociefy."
An excellent statement of the same principle is found in
Robertson v. Baldwni.10
"The la*'v is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of
Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles
of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties
and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the
necessities of the case. -In incorporating these principles into
the fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding
the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they
had been formally expressed. Thus the freedom of speech and
of the press (Art. I) does not permit the publication of
libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation."
In Schenck v. U.S.," a case arising under the Espionage Act,
TMr. Justice Holmes, .in affirming the conviction, undertook to
lay down a general rule.
"The question in every case is whether the words used [when
they are claimed to be protected by the 1st Amendment] are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress had a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree."
Eight months later this distinguished jurist, in a dissenting opinion
(Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring), applied the rule in favor of
defendants who were Russian Communists convicted under the
Espionage Act for distributing some inflammatory leaflets. The
9(1890) 133 U. S. 333, 10 S. Ct 299, 33 L. Ed. 637
10(1897) 165 U. S. 275, 17 S. Ct. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715.
" (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470.
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opinion reaches a height of eloquence which I think justifies the
following quotation, although it is perhaps too general in terms
to be of discriminatory use in this inquiry
"When men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of theit own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every
year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is a part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country
Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to
leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making
an exception to the sweeping command, 'Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech.' ,
I regret that
I cannot put into more impressive -words my belief that in
their conviction upon 'this indictment the defendants were
deprived12 of their rights under the Constitution of the United
States."At the same term with the Schenck Case the rule was applied
without dissent in Frohwerk v U S." and Debs v. U S., 4
both cases under the Espionage Act. The following year (1920)
five cases arising under the same act were considered together.15
The majority opinion applied the same rule, recognizing the fact
that its application necessarily turns upon what is conceived to
be the degree of the subversive character and effect of the utterances in question, and holding that the verdict of the jury under
a charge deemed to be proper was conclusive. In a vigorous
opinion, dissenting as to certain of the defendants, Mr. Justice
Brandeis (Mr. Justice Holmes concurring) said.
"And because it is a question of degree, the field in which
the jury may exercise its judgment is necessarily, a wide one.
12Abrans v. United States, (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.
Ed. 1173.
13(1919) 249 U. S.204, 39 S.Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561.
14(1919) 249 U. S: 211, 39 S. Ct. 252, 63 L. Ed. 566.
15
See Schaefer v. United States, (1920) 251 U. S.466, 40 S. Ct. 259,
64 L. Ed. 360.
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But its field is not unlimited. The trial provided for is one
by judge and jury, and the judge may not abdicate his function. If the words were of such a nature and were used under
such circumstances that men, judging in cahliness, could not
reasonably say that they created a clear and present danger
that they would bring about the evil which Congress sought
and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of the trial
judge to withdraw the case from the consideration of the
jury."y
Pierce v. United States 6 followed closely upon the Schaefer
Case and.was substantially a parallel to it. Justices Brandeis and
Holmes again dissented.
V
So far as principles of interpretation are to be derived from
the cases above cited, it need hardly be argued that they are also
applicable to state legislation involving the exercise of the police
power, subject to the rule that when state legislation is challenged
in a federal court there is a strong presumption in favor of its
validity. The disposition of the Court to uphold a state statute
when possible was shown in a brief opinion by Justice Holmes in
Fox v. Washnigton.'7 A Washington statute inade it a gross
or having a
misdemeanor to publish anything "encouraging
., or
the commission of any crime
tendency to encourage
which shall tend to encourage, or advocate disrespect for law."
The information charged "editing printed matter tending to encourage and advocate disrespect for law." The opinion quotes
some of the objectonable language, and says:
"Thus by indirection, but unmistakably, the article encourages and incites a persistence in what we must assume would
be a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure, and
It does not appear and is not likely
the jury so found.
that the statute will be construed to prevent publications
merely because they tend to produce unfavorable opinions of
a particular statute or of law in general. In this present case
the disrespect for law that was encouraged was disregard
of it,--an overt breach and technically criminal act."
The summary character of this opinion is in striking contrast to
the space given to later cases where freedom of the press was at
issue. In Gilbert v. Minnesota,'8 the majority upheld a conviction
under a Minnesota statute analogous to the federal Espionage
16(1920) 252 U. S. 239, 40 S. Ct. 205, 64 L. Ed. 542.

17(1915) 236 U. S. 273, 35 S. Ct. 383, 59 L. Ed. 573.
38(1920) 254 U. S. 325, 41 S. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287
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Act as a valid exercise of the state's police power, applying the
rule in the Schenck Case to the facts. In Gitlow v. New York, 19
supra, the majority limited the rule. The statute under which the
defendant was convicted made it a felony to in any way teach the
duty of overthrowing lawful government by violence or any unlawful means, and the defendant had been engaged in the distribution of the so-called Left Wing Manifesto of the Socialist party
The Court said
"When the legislative body has determined generally, in the
constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a
certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they
must be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of
itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration.
The question in such cases is entirely different from that involved in those cases where the statute
merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself, and it
is sought to apply its provisions to language used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited reThe general statement in the Schenck Case
sults.
was manifestly intended to apply only in cases of this class,
and has no application to those like the present, where the
legislative body itself has previously determined the danger
of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified
character."
Justices Holmes and Brandeis stood by their guns and dissented.
They insisted that "if the correct test is applied (i.e., the rule in
the Schenck Case) it is manifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the
part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's
20
we find them
views." Two years later, in Whitney v. California,
earnestly supporting the same view
There have been many varieties of legislation brought before
the Supreme Court under the claim that they, or their particular
applications, invaded the constitutionally protected freedoms. In
one case2 1 there was involved a California statute which made it
a felony to display a red flag in a public place as (1) "an emblem
of opposition to organized government," (2) "an invitation to
anarchistic action," or (3) "an aid to propaganda that is of a
seditious character." The information charged the violation of all
19(1925) 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138.
20(1927) 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095.

-1Stromberg v. California, (1931) 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L.
Ed. 1117
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three clauses, and there was a general verdict of guilty. The decision of the Supreme Court of California sustaining the conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court..The position of its majority appears in the following excerpt from the
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes:
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means
is a fundamental principle in our constitutional
system. A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively
construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the
guaranty of liberty in the 14th Amendment. The first clause
of the statute being invalid upon its face, the conviction of
the appellant, which so far as the record discloses may have
rested upon that clause exclusively, must be set aside."-'
Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented.
A wholly different kind of attack on freedom of the press was
involved in Grosslean v. American Press Co.,2 which held a
Louisiana statute imposihg a license tax on the business of publishing advertisements in newspapers of moie than a prescribed
circulation invalid as an infringement of the constitutional liberty
of the press. The Court (by Justice Sutherland) briefly reviewed
the-history of English and Colonial attempts to restrict the press
and says

"It is impossible to concede that by the words 'freedom of
the press' the framers of the First Amendment intended to
adopt merely the narrow view then reflected by the law of
England that such freedom consisted only in mmunity from
previous censorship, for this abuse had then permanently
disappeared from English practice. It is equally impossible
to believe that it was not intended to bring with the reach of
these .words such modes of restraint as were embodied in the
two forms of taxation already described [i.e., stamp duties
In the light of all
on newspapers and advertisements].
that has now been said, it is evident that the restricted rules
of the English law in respect of the freedom of the press in
force when the Constitution was adopted, were never accepted by the American colonists, and that by the First
Amendment it was meant to preclude the national government, and by the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude the
states, from adopting any form of previous restraint upon
2
-The well known case of Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, (1931) 283
U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357, ought not to be passed without
mention, but it is not deemed sufficiently essential to our present inquiry
to warrant the space which would be required for adequate discussion.
23(1936) 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct: 444, 80 L. Ed. 660.
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printed publications, or their circulation, including that which
had theretofore been effected by these two well-known and
odious methods.
Judge Cooley has laid down the tet to
be applied-'The evils to be prevented were not censorship
of the press, merely, but any action of the government by
means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seem absolutely essential to pre,
pare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as
citizens.'
It is not intended by anything we have said
to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from
any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government. But this is not an ordinary tax, but one single in
kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.
[The tax] is bad because, in the light
of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit
the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
by virtue of the constituional guaranties."
DeJonge v. Oregon24 involved another application of a "Criminal Syndicalism" statute. The defendant had been convicted
thereunder upon evidence which showed merely that lie had assisted in the conduct of a meeting held' under the auspices of the
Communist Party, without proof that either he or the assemblage
committed any of the subversive acts, or uttered any of the language prohibited by the act. The statute "as applied to the particular
charge as defined by the state cQurt," was held repugnant to the
"due process" clause of the 14th Amendment as an interference
with the rights of free speech and free assembly This case was
closely parallel to Fiske v. Kansas,25 decided ten years before,
Both illustrate what has come to be the established practice of the
court, to construe a statute, when attacked as unconstitutional,
with strict reference to the particular facts of the instant case.
Shortly after the DeJonge Case came Herndon v. Lowry,20 which
was similar so far as it decided the point involving freedom of
speech. This was one of the "five to four" decisions where the
more liberal view was supported by the Chief Justice and justices
Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo, and the more conservative by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and
Butler.
VI.
In recent years the Jehovah's Witnesses have becomc increasingly active in propagating their faith, and correspondingly
-(1937) 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278.
25(1927) 274 U. S. 380, 47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108.
26(1937) 301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066.
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unpopular in communities where their teachings and methods have
been found annoying. Attempts have been made in many states
to repress or regulate them by legislation. These have been umformly resisted. With the zeal and persistence of martyrs the
Witnesses have pursued their course and taken the consequences.
However, in spite of their doctrinal repudiation of earthly governments they have not hesitated to appeal to the courts. In the
spring of 1938 one of their cases reached the Supreme Court of
the Unite

States, Lovell v. City of Grtffin.

7

At that time Justices

Van Devanter and Sutherland had been succeeded by Justices
Black -and Reed.
As to the then accepted interpretation of pergonal rights as
guaranteed by the Constitution, I venture the following deductions
from the cases heretofore cited.
1. The rights of free exercise of religion, free speech, free press
and free assembly will be protected against infringement by the
states, ,except when the utterance or act in question is (a) a crime
at common law; or (b) a statutory offense, and under all the circumstances of the particular case there is a clear and present
danger that the prohibited utterance or act will bring about a
serious evil which the legislation is designed to prevent,--this
being subject, however, to the rule that when the legislature has
declared that a specific utterance or act is attended with danger
that will bring about the evil sought to be prevented, that declaration is final and conclusive.
It is obvious that in cases falling under "b", without such
terms in the prohibitory legislation as bring the case within the
modified rule, the standard must be the individual opinions of the
majority of the Court. How this standard has changed with
changes in personnel will be observed in the cases now to be
considered.
2. A specific tax upon printed publications, the purpose of
which is to place a restraint upon the dissemination of information, is an unconstitutional violation of the freedom of the press.
In the Lovell Case the defendants had been convicted under an
ordinance of the City of Griffin, Ga., which forbade under penalty,
as a public nuisance, "the practice of distributing, either by hand
or othervise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of
any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether
same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of
27(1938) 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949.
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the City of Griffin." Appellant did not apply for a permit, claiming
that she was sent by Jehovah to do His work, and that such an
application would have been "an act of disobedience to His commandment." It had been well settled by previous decisions that
municipal ordinances, adopted under state authority, constitute
state action, and are within the prohibitions of the 14th Amendment. The Court held unanimously (Justice Cardozo, however,
taking no part) that the ordinance was invalid on its face. "The
liberty of the press," said the Chief Justice, "became initially a
right to publish "wthout a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint
upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty
of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose
Legislation of
in the adoption of the Constitutional provision.
the type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of
license and censorship in its baldest form." This principle was
sustained in a subsequent case which came up in June, 1939, from
a different source,-Hague v Committee for Industrial Organtation. 28 It was held therein that a municipal ordinance, which was
construed to empower a city official to refuse a permit for the use
of public streets and parks for purposes of political meetings on
the ba5is of his mere opinion that the refusal would prevent riots
or disturbances, 'was a violation of the freedom of speech and
assembly protected by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented. Justice Cardozo
had been succeeded by Justice Douglas. So many of the later
cases to which the Witnesses were parties involved the use of public
places that it seems appropriate to give some space to the Court's
discussion in the Hague Case of Davis v. Massachusetts,2 decided
in 1897 Quoting from the majority opinion
There
"The petitioners rely on Davis v Massachusetts.
it appeared that, pursuant to enabling legislation, the city
of Boston adopted an ordinance prohibiting anyone from
speaking, discharging fire-arms, selling goods or maintaining
any booth for public amusement on any of the public grounds
of the city except under a permit from the Mayor Davis
spoke on Boston Common without a permit. He was charged
with a violation of the ordinance and moved to quash the
complaint, rater alia, on the ground that the ordinance
abridged his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the
United States and denied him due process of law because it
was arbitrary and unreasonable. His contentions were over28(1939) 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423.
29(1897) 167 U. S. 43, 17 S. Ct. 731, 42 L. Ed. 71.
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ruled and he was convicted. The judgment was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and by tlus Court.
The-decision seems to be grounded on the holding of the
State Court that the Common 'was absolutely under the
control of the legislature.'
The Court added that the 14th
Amendment did not destroy the power of the states to enact
police regulations as to a subject within their control, or
enable citizens to use public property in defiance of the Constitution and laws of the State. The ordinance there in question apparently had a different purpose from that of the one
here challenged, for it was not directed solely at the exercise
of the right of free speech and assembly, but was addressed
as well to other activities not in the nature of civil rights,
which doubtless might be regulated or prohibited as respects
their enjoyment in parks. In the instant case the ordinance
deals only with the right of assembly for the purpose of
communicating views entertained by speakers.
We have
no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the
Davis Case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it
rules the instant case. Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between pitizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The
privilege
is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance -with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied."
3
Schneider v. Nez, Jersey
" was decided at the October Term
in 1939, at which .time Justice Brandeis had been succeeded by
Justice Frankfurter. Four cases were considered together, involving
municipal ordinances of different cities. Three of these absolutely
prohibited the distribution of handbills or other printed matter
in public places, and in two cities throwing them on the streets was
specifically forbidden. The ordinance involved in the Schneider
Case prescribed that "no person except as in this ordinance provided shall canvass, solicit, distribute circulars, or other matter, or
call from house to house." The condition referred to -was the issue
of a permit by the Chief of Police, with prior investigation, photographing and finger printing. The defendant Schneider was a
Jehoyah's Witness, engaged in canvassing for the sale and distribution of the literature of the sect "at all hours of the day and
night." The Supreme Court of New Jersey held the ordinance a
30 (1939) 308 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155.
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valid exercise of police power, to protect citizens against fraudulent
solicitation. The Court (by Justice Roberts) held that the judgment in each case should be reversed. In relation to Schneider Case
it was said
"We are not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting
and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as
the ordinance requires. Nor do we hold that the town may
not fix reasonable hours when the canvassing may be done
by persons having such objects as the petitioner. Doubtless
there are other features of such activities which may be
regulated in the public interest without prior license or other
invasion of constitutional liberty We do hold, however, that
the ordinance in question, as applied to the petitioner's conduct, is void."
In the other three cases the courts below had held that the
purpose of the prohibitions was to prevebt littering the streets, an
appropriate police function. The Supreme Court said with respect
to this
"Even as thus construed the ordinance cannot be enforced
The public
without abridging the liberty of free speech.
convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not
justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free
communication of information and opinio secured by the
Constitution." 31
The next important case in the series involving Jehovah's Witnesses was Cantwell v. Conmecticut,32 decided in May, 1940. A
state statute prohibited the solicitation of money for alleged religious causes from persons other than members of the group for
which the money was being solicited, unless a local official should
have determined the cause to be a religious one and had approved it as such. The defendant had been convicted of its violation
by canvassing from house to house, playing records, and soliciting
sales of the group's religious books and pamphlets. The case was
brought to the Supreme Court after defendant's conviction had
been sustained by the highest state court. The customary attack
on the constitutionality of the statute was made. The statute as
applied in the case was held by a unanimous court to violate the
31In April, 1940, the Court (by Justice Murphy who had succeeded
Justice Butler) applied the principles laid down in the more recent cascs,
discussed in the text, to peaceable picketing; Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940)
310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093, Carlson v. California. (1940)
310 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104. Justice McReynolds alone dissented in each of these cases. They are not here discussed because the facts
differ substantially from those involved in Jehovah's Witnesses cases, and
no modification of accepted principles appears.
32(1940) 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 987
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religious freedom guaranteed by the due process clause of the
14th Amendment against infringement by the state. This liberty
was stated not only to forestall legal compulsion to force acceptance
of any religious creed or practice, but also to safeguard the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion. It was recoguzed that
theexercise of religion might be subjected to reasonable regulation
so far as such exercise involved freedom to act. It was admitted
that the state might regulate the'. time, place and manner of soliciting upon the public streets, and in other respects safeguard the
public peace, order and comfort. The actual regulation before the
Court was field not to constitute a legitimate regulation but to
be rather a form of religious censorship which lost none of its
reality by having the official's acts subject to judicial review. The
judgment of the state court was accordingly reversed.
In June, 1940, there was a backwash in the stream of liberal
decisions,-the much discussed Gobitis Case. 3 Two children, aged
ten and twelve, pupils in the public schools of Minersville, Pa.,
refused to salute the national flag as part of the daily school program. Their parents were Jehovah's Witnesses, and they had been
brought up to believe that such a gesture was within the prohibition of verses 3, 4 and 5 of the 20th Chapter of Exodus. The
salute was required by a resolution of the local school board. The
children were excluded from school, and the father, under the
compulsory attendance law of the state, was compelled to incur
expense for the continuance of their education in private schools.
Upon his petition for relief by injunction the writ was granted by
the Federal District Court, and its decree was affirmed in the
Circuit Court of Appeals. Since this decision ran counter to
several per curiam orders by the Supreme Court, cerliorari was
granted so that the question might have full consideration. The
majority opinion reaffirms the essential elements of religious freedom. It concedes that govern'inent may not interfere with either
organized or individual expressions of religious belief or unbelief.
It is equally positive in its assertion that there are limits on one's
freedom to follow one's own conscience as a guide to action or
inaction. The problem is posed in terms of the traditional technique of balancing the individual interest in religious freedom
against society's interest in promoting what the legislature believes
to be the common good. That good in the instant case was the
3Minersville School District v. Gobitis, (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 60 S. Ct.
1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375. This case was expressly overruled in W\est Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, (1943) 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178,
87 L. Ed. 1628.
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promotion of national unity and thereby the nation's security No
one can read the carefully prepared opinion by Justice Frankfurter
without feeling sure that the Court reached its conclusions only
after very serious consideration of the case. Some brief quotations
will reflect the spirit of the decision
"The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by
those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the
educational process is not for our independent judgment.
Even were we convinced of the folly of such a measure, such
belief would be no proof of its unconstitutionality For ourselves, we might be tempted to say that the deepest patriotism is best engendered by giving unfettered scope to the most
crotchety beliefs. Perhaps it is best, even from the standpoint
of those interests which ordinances like the one under review
seek to promote, to give to the least popular sect leave from conformities like those here in issue. But the court room is not
For
the arena for debating issues of educational policy
us to insist that, though the ceremony may be required, exceptional immunity must be given to dissidents, is to maintam that there is no basis for a legislative judgment that
such an exemption might introduce elements of difficulty into
the school discipline, might cast doubt in the minds of other
children which would themselves weaken the effect of the
To fight out the wise use of legislative authority
exercise.
in the forum of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial
arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people."
A wholly different evaluation of the conflicting interests
present in the case, coupled with considerable doubt as to the
reasonableness and efficacy of the means employed to promote
unanimity of feeling, was the basis of Justice Stone's dissent.
He concludes a vigorous dissent with the following words
"The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the
people that democratic processes must be preserved at all
costs. It is also an expression of -faith and a command that
freedom of mind and spirit must be preserved, which government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice and moderation without which no free government can exist. For tils
reason it would seem that legislation which operates to repress the religious freedom of small minorities, which is
admittedly within the scope of the protection of the Bill of
Rights, must at least be subject to the same judicial scrutiny
as legislation which we have recently held to infringe the constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities. With
such scrutiny I cannot say that the inconveniences which may
attend some sensible adjustment of school discipline in order
that the religious convictions of these children may be spared,
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presents a problem so momentous or pressing as to outweigh the freedom from compulsory violation of religious
faith which has been thought worthy of constitutional protection."
In Cox v. New Hampslhre" our sequence of cases returns to
the public streets. A state statute prohibited parades upon the
public streets unless a license was first obtained from selectmen
of the town in which the parade was to be held. A group of
Jehovah's Witnesses, without either procuring or even attempting to procure the reqired license, paraded on the sidewalks of the
business streets of a town on a busy Saturday night, carrying
placards and distributing their literature. The defendants assailed
their conviction on the basis of the alleged unconstitutionality of
the statute as applied to their activities. They had been convicted solely on the charge of having paraded without the requisite license. The highest state court had construed the statute
as requiring the, local officials, in enforcing the license provision,
to consider only those factors bearing on the statute's limited
purpose of protecting the public interest in the use of the streets.
The Court sustained the statute so construed, and also its application to the defendants. Its opinion recognizes the right of a state,
in controlling the use of its public streets for parades, to take into
consideration the -time, place and manner of the demanded use
in relation to other proper uses of its streets. Hence .a system intended to give effect to that public interest cannot be held a denial
of freedom of religion and speech, provided no unfair discrimmation is practiced in its operation. The Lovell, Hague, Schneider,
Cantwell, Thornhill and Carlson Cases were distinguished. In the.
following year a Witness who, while distributing literature in a
public street, addressed another person as a "damned Fascist"
and a "damned racketeer" was denied immunity under the "free
speech" provisions of the Constitution."5
In December, 1941 came the important decision in Bridges v.
California.36 It was a contempt case, based upon publications, and
did not involve Jehovah's vitnesses. Chief Justice Hughes had
retired from the Bench and Justice Byrnes had come on. Chief
Justice Stone and Justice Roberts were the only survivors of the
Court as it was constituted five years before. One might wish that
the 54 pages consumed by the report of this case were required
34(940)
312 U. S: 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049.
35
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, (1942) 315 U. S. 568, 62 S. CL 766,
86 L. Ed. 1031.
'6(1941) 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192.
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reading for every American lawyer The limits of liberty of the
press were ably discussed in the Court's opinion setting aside two
California convictions, written by Justice Black, and in the dissent by Justice Frankfurter (the Chief Justice, and Justices
Roberts and Byrnes concurring). For our purposes the important
point in the decision is the following qualification of the rule in
Schenck
"What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger'
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not
purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of
protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than
recognize a minimum of compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For
the First Amendment does not speak equivocally It prohibits
any law 'abiidging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that
explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving
soci&y, will allow"
This new division of five to four could hardly be accounted
for on the basis of temperamental liberality and conservatism. Did
it not clearly indicate that in the field of personal rights cases
which allowed of difference in the evaluation of what were deemed
to be determinative facts will be decided according to the tinpredictable attitudes of the respective judges And must not one
surmise that in doubtful cases the hitherto settled presumption
in favor of state legislation will give way to a presumption ii
favor of constitutional guaranties?
In Valentine v Christensen, , decided the following April,
there was no difference of opinion as to the constitutionality of a
statute forbidding distribution on the streets of advertising matter,
even when the purpose was camouflaged by accompanying expressions of opinion which alone could not have been lawfully prohibited. Shortly afterwards came Jones v. Opelika,3" which was
argued and decided with two other cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, one from Arkansas and one from Arizona. As the Jones
Case finally came to the Supreme Court it presented the question
whether the petitioner was properly found guilty of violating an
ordinance of the City of Opelika, Ala., on evidence that, without
a license, he had displayed pamphlets (literature of the Witnesses)
in his upraised hand and walked on a city street selling them two
for five cents. The ordinance made it an offense, punishable by
37(1942) 316 U. S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920. 86 L. Ed. 1262.
38(1942) 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691.
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fine and imprisonment, to pursue certain vocations without a
license, for which specified fees were provided. Jones was charged
with operating, without a license, as a transient distributor of
books, for which the annual license fee was $5. In the Arkansas
case an ordinance declared it to be unlawful "to pursue any of the
following vocations or businesses in the city of Fort Smith" without
a license,-"For each person peddling dry goods, notions, wearing
specifically
apparel, household goods or other articles not herein
mentioned, $25 per month, $10 per week, $2.50 per day." "The
petitioners," in the words of Justice ReA who wrote the majority
opinion, "in the exercise of their beliefs concerning their duty to
preach the gospel, admitted going from house to house without a
license, playing phonographic transcriptions of Bible lectures, and
distributing books setting forth their views to the residents in return for a contribution of twenty-five cents per book. When persons
desiring books were unable to contribute, the books were in some
instances given away free." In the Arizona case the appellant
was convicted on a charge that, not having a permanent place of
business in the city, he there carried on "the business of peddling,'
vending, selling, offering for sale and soliciting the sale of goods,
wares and merchandise, to wit: pamphlets, books and publications,
without first having procured a license." The terms of the ordinance in question and the facts were closely parallel to the Arkansas case, except that the license fee required was $25 quarterly.
The Court upon the record eliminated all question as to the
reasonableness of the required fees, and stated that the sole constitutional question considered was "whether a non-discriminatory
license fee, presumably appropriate in amount, may be imposed
upon" the activities above recited. This question was answered in
the affirmative. The Court said.
"When proponents of social or religious theories use the ordinary commercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of the power
of the State to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of
canvassing. Careful as we may and should be to protect the
freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to
see in such enactments a shadow of prohibition of the exercise of religion or of abridgment of the freedom of speech or
the press. It is prohibitive and unjustifiable abridgment
which are interdicted, not taxation. Nor do we believe it can
be fairly said that because such proper charges may be expanded into unjustifiable abridgments they are therefore
It is because we find these sales as
invalid on their face.
partaking more of commercial than religious or educational
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transactions that we find the ordinances, as here presented,
valid."
The Chief Justice in a dissenting opinion stated the question
thus
"Whether a flat tax, more than a nominal fee to defray the
expenses of a regulatory license, can constitutionally be laid
on a non-commercial, non-profit activity devoted exclusively
to the dissemination of ideas, educational and religious in
character, to those persons who consent to receive them ?"
He concludes as follows -4
"In its potency as a prior restraint on publication, the flat
license tax falls short only of outright censorship or suppression. The more humble and needy the cause, the more effective is the suppression."
justice Murphy presented a supplementary opinion in which
the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas concurred, stressing points as indicated by the following excerpts
"There is no suggestion in any of these three cases that
petitioners were perpetrating a fraud, that they were demeaning themselves in an obnoxious manner, that their
activities created any public disturbance or inconvenience,
that private rights were contravened, or that the literature
distributed was offensive to morals or created any 'clear and
Whatever the
present danger' to organized society
amount, the taxes are in reality taxes upon the dissemination
of religious ideas, a dissemination carried on by the distribution of religious literature for religious reasons alone and
not for personal profit. As such they place a burden on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the exercise of
religion, even if the question of amount is laid aside. Liberty
Taxes
of circulation is the very life-blood of a free press.
on circulation solely for the purpose of revenue were successfully resisted, prior to the adoption of the First Amendment,
We need not
as interferences with freedom of the press.
shut our eyes to the possibility that use may again be made of
such taxes, either by discrimination in enforcement or otherwise, to suppress the unpalatable views of militant minorities
One need only read the
such as Jehovah's Witnesses.
decisions of this and other courts in the past few years to see
the unpopularity of Jehovah's Witnesses and the difficulties
put in their path because of their religious beliefs. An arresting parallel exists between the troubles of Jehovah's
Witnesses and the struggles of various dissentient groups in
the American Colonies, which culminated in the Virginia
Statute for Religious Freedom, the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, and the First Amendment."
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The opinion concludes with the following words, which echo
the significant pronouncement quoted above from the Bridges Case
to which the Chief Justice did not then subscribe :-3
"If this Court is to err in evaluating claims that freedom of
speech, freedom of, the press, and freedom of religion have
been invaded, far better that it err in being over-protective
of these precious rights."
Andwhere shall we find a finer example of judicial openmindedness than this memorandum, appended by Justices Black,
Douglas and Murphy"The opinion of the Court sanctions a device which in our
opinion suppresses, or tends to suppress the free exercise of
a religion practiced by a minority group. This is but another step in the direction which Minersville School Disrict
v. Gobztzs
took against the same religious minority, and
is a logical extension of the principles upon which that
decision rested. Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis
Case, we think this an appropriate occasion to state that
we - now believe that it also was wrongly decided. Certainly
our democratic form of government, functioning under the
historic Bill of Rights, has a high responsibility to dccommodate itself to the religious views of-minorities, however
unpopular and unorthodox those views may be. The First
Amendment does not put the right freely to exercise religion in a subordinate position. We fear, however, that
the opinions in these and in the Gobitts Case do exatfly that."
The Witnesses were again before the Court in March, 1943, in
two cases,--Jannson v. Texas4 and Largent v. Texas.41 In the
latter case the ordinance, whicl required a permit from the mayor
to canvass for the sale of books, etc., to be issued only when he
-should, after investigation, deem it proper, was held to be void
on its face. In the former "holding" advertisements "by hand
or otherwise" in the public streets, and "scattering handbills" were
forbidden. It was held invalid as applied to the sale of literature
by the Witnesses in their customary manner. Justice Rutledge, who
had just succeeded- Justice Byrnes, took no part.
The thirteen Jehovah's Witnesses cases which occupied the
attentioi of the Court on May 3, 1943, were disposed of in four
42
decisions,--Martin v. City of Struthers,
Murdock v. Pennsyl39 ustices Reed and Jackson, who were with the majority in the
Bridges Case are, in"the Opelika Case, found with three of the Justices
who then dissented in favor of a more conservative view.
40(1943) 318 U. S. 413, 63 S. Ct. 669, 87 L. Ed. 869.
41(1943) 318 U. S. 418, 63 S. Ct. 667, 87 L. Ed. 873.
42(1943) 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313.
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vana,43 (with seven other cases), Douglas v. City of Jeannette,"
and Jones v. City of Opelika.4 " The Martin Case involved a city
ordinance which made it unlawful for any persons distributing
handbills, circulars, or other advertising matter, to ring a doorbell
or otherwise summon the inmate of a residence to the door for
the purpose of receiving such matter. It was held invalid. Justice
Black writing the opinion stated that "Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so
clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting
aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner
of distribution, it must be fully preserved."
Justice Murphy wrote a concurring opinion (Justices Douglas
and Rutledge joining), in which he stressed the religious character of the material distributed in the instant case.. "Prohibition,"
he said, "may be more convenient to the law-maker, and easier
to fashion than a regulatory measure which adequately protects
the peace and privacy of the home without suppressing legitimate
religious activities. But that does not justify a repressive enactment
Freedom of religion has a higher
like the one now before us.
dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal convenience. In these days free men have no loftier responsibility
than the preservation of that freedom." Justice Frankfurter
presents a separate opinion, indicating that the reason he does
not dissent i's because he thinks the majority opinion may be so
interpreted as to depend upon the view that the ordinance "is an
invidious discrimination against the distributors of what is politely
called literature," and is not to be construed as a general police
regulation to protect householders from unwelcome intrusion.
Justice Reed, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Roberts
and Jackson concur, considers the ordinance "a fair adjustment of
the privilege of distributors and the rights of householders."
The Murdock Case involved the imposition of a license tax.
The case was recognized by the Court as parallel with Jones v
Opelika,46 and the holdings in that case were reconsidered. The
opinion (by Justice Douglas) concludes [The ordinance] "sets
aside the residential areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is
denied petitioners unless the tax is paid. That restraint and one
43(1943) 319 U. S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292.
44(1943) 319 U. S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877, 87 L. Ed. 1324, rehearing denied,
(1943) 319 U. S. 782, 63 S. Ct. 1170, 87 L. Ed. 1726.
45(1943) 319 U. S. 103, 63 S. Ct. 890, 87 L. Ed. 1290. This was a rehearing of the case reported in 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691,
which it overruled.

46(1942) 316 U. S.584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691.

DEBT TO JEHOVAH'S WVITINESSES

which is city-wide in scope (Jones v. Opelika) are different only
'in degree. Each is an abridgment of freedom of press and a
restraint -on the. free exercise of religion. They stand or fall together. The judgment in Jones v. Opelika has tlus day been
vacated. Freed from that controlling precedent, we can restore to
their high, constitutional position the liberties of itinerant evangelists who disseminate their religious beliefs and the tenets of
their faith through distribution of literature." In view of the
nature of Justice Jackson's dissent, hereinafter referred to, the
following paragraph from the majority opinion is of special
interest:
"Considerable emphasis is placed on the kind of literature
which petitioners were distributing-its provocative, abusive
and ill-mannered character, and the assault which it makes
on our established churches and the cherished faiths of many
of us.
But those considerations are no justification for
the license tax which the ordinance imposes. Plainly a conmumty may not suppress, or the state tax, the dissemination
of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful.
If that device were ever sanctioned, there would have been
forged a ready instrument for the suppression of the faith
which any minority cherishes but which does not happen to
be in favor. That would be a complete repudiation of the
philosophy of the Bill of Rights."
The Douglas Case also involved a license tax and came before
the Court as a petition to restrain a prosecution. This form of relief was unanimously denied, without consideration of the points
discussed in the other cases. Justice Jackson, while concurring in
this result, took advantage of the fuller showing of facts in the
record to file a vigorous opinion, in which Justice Frankfurter
joined, covering the Martin and Murdock Cases, dissenting in these
cases and presenting the statement of facts covering all the cases
from which quotations were made early in this article.
"Our difference of opinion," he says, "cannot fairly be
given the color of a disagreement as to whether the constitutional rights of Jehovah's Witnesses should be protected
in so far as they are rights. These Witnesses, in common
with all others, have extensive rights to proselyte and propagandize. These of course include the right to oppose and
criticize the Roman Catholic Church or any other denomination. These rights are, and should be held to be, as extensive
as any orderly society can tolerate in religious disputation.
The real question is where their rights end and the rights of
others begin. The real task of determining the extent of their
rights on balance with the rights of others is not met by
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pronouncement of general propositions with which there is
no disagreement.
"If we should strip these cases to the underlying questions, I find them too difficult as constitutional problems to
be disposed of by a vague but fervent transcendentalism.
"In my view the First Amendment assures the broadest
tolerable exercise of free speech, free press, and free assembly, not merely for religious purposes, but for political,
economic, scientific, news, or informational ends as well.
When limits are reached which such communications must
observe, can one go farther under the cloak of religious evangelism' Does what is obscene, or commercial, or abusive, or
inciting, become less so if employed to promote a religious
ideology? I had not supposed that the rights of secular and
non-religious communications were more narrow or in any
way inferior to those of avowed religious groups.
"I cannot accept the holding in the Murdock Case that
the behavior revealed here 'occupies the same high estate
under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches
and preaching from the pulpits.' To put them on the same
constitutional plane seems to me to have a dangerous tendency towards discrediting religious freedom.
Nor am I
convinced that we can have freedom of religion only by
denying the American's deep-seated conviction that his home
is a refuge from the pulling and hauling of the market place
and the street. For a stranger to corner a man in his home,
summon him to the door and put him in the position either of
arguing his religion or of ordering one of unknown disposition to leave is a questionable use of religious freedom.
"I find it impossible to believe that the Struthers Case
can be solved by reference to the statement that 'The authors
of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to
encourage a freedom which they believed essential if a
vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful
ignorance.' I doubt if only the slothfully ignorant wish repose
in their homes, or that the forefathers intended to open the
door to such forced 'enlightenment' as we have here.
"This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples
of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added. So it was with liberty
of contract, which was discredited by being overdone. The
Court is adding a new privilege to over-ride the rights of
others to what has before been regarded as religious liberty
In so doing it needlessly creates a risk of discrediting a wise
provision of our Constitution which protects all-those in
homes as well as those out of them-in the peaceful, orderly
practice of the religion of their choice but which gives no
right to force it upon others."
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By a per curiain order .the judgments previously entered in
Jones v. City of Opelika and the two cases heard with it were
vacated and the judgments of the state courts reversed, for the
reasons stated in the Murdock Case. Justice Reed filed a dissenting
opinion- covering these four cases. I quote merely from the concluding paragraph.
"The lifiitations of the Constitution are not maxims of social
wisdom but definite controls on the legislative, process. We
are dealing with power, not with its abuse. This late withdrawal of the power of taxation over the distribution activities of those covered by the First Amendment fixes what
seems to us an unfortunate principle of tax exemption,
capable of indefinite extension. We had thought that such
an exemption required a clear and definite grant. This we
do not find in the language of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson concur, Justice Frankfurter filing a supplementary opinion, in which Justice Jackson
joins.
Not daunted by the decision in the Gobntis Case, the Witnesses
kept up their fight, and in June, 1943, the flag salute was again
before the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.47 Perhaps because, in part, of its rather dramatic features the Gobitis Case attracted wide attention and therefore the
reversal foreshadowed in Jones v. Opelika,' has a special interest
which warrants space to insure a fairly adequate picture of the
attitude of the respective members of the Court who expressed
their views in the Barnette Case. The opinion .vas written by
Justice Jackson. Concurring opinions were presented by Justices
.Black and, Douglas and by Justice Murphy. Justices Roberts and
Reed noted their adherence to their former vievys, and Justice
Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion.
Said Justice Jackson:
"Validity of the asserted power to force an American citizen
publicly to profess any statement of belief or to engage in
any ceremony of assent to one presents questions of power
that must be considered independently of any idea we may
have as to the utility of the ceremony in question.
"Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession
of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they
are held. While religion supplies respondents' motive for
enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case,
47(1943) 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628.
48(1942) 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691.
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many citizens who do not share these religious views hold
such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of
the individual. It is not necessary to inquire whether nonconformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute
unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty
"The Gobitis decision, however, assumned, as did the argument in that case and in this,.that power exists in the state
to impose the flag salute discipline upon school chil'dren in
general. The Court only examined and rejected a claim based
on religious beliefs of immunity from an unquestioned general
rule. The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so touching matters of
opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any
political organization under our Constitution. We examine
rather than assume existence of this power and, against this
broader definition of issues in this case, re-examine specific
grounds for the Gobitis decision."
These specific grounds were then severally discussed, and the
conclusion was reached that the assumption on which the Gobitis
decision was reached was erroneous
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which per(A footmit an exception, they do not now occur to us."
note recognizes the constitutional right to raise armies and
adds.."It follows, of course, that those subject to military
discipline are under many duties and may not claim many
treedoms that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life.")
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control."
justices Black and Douglas say they "substantially" agree with
Justice Jackson, but recognize more specifically the question of
religious freedom.
"The statute requires the appellees to participate in a ceremony aimed at inculcating respect for the flag and for this
country The Jehovah's Witnesses, without any desire to
show disrespect for either the flag or the country, interpret
the Bible as commanding, at the risk of God's displeasure,
that they not go through the form of a pledge of allegiance
to any flag. The devoutness of their belief is evidenced by
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their willingness to suffer persecution and punishment, rather
than make the pledge."
C"
Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently
to laws which are either imperatively necessary to protect
society as a whole from grave and pressingly imminent
dangers or which, -without any general prohibition, merely
regulate time, place or manner of religious activity. Decision
as to the constitutionality of particular laws which strike at
the substance of religious tenets and practices must be made
by this Court. The duty is a solemn one, and in meeting it
we cannot say that a failure, because of religious scruples,
to assume a particular physical, position and to repeat the
words of a patriotic formula creates a grave danger to the
nation.
"Neither our domestic tranquility in peace nor our martial
effort in war depend on compelling little children to participate in a ceremony which ends in nothing for them but a
fear of spiritual condemnation. If, as we think, their fears
are groundless, time and reason are the proper antidotes for
their errors. The ceremonial, when enforced against conscientious objectors, more likely to defeat than to serve its
high purpose, is a handy implement for disguised religious
persecution. As such, it is inconsistent with our Constitution's plan and purpose."
Mr. Justice Murphy concurring, says"The complaint challenges an order of the State Board
of Education which requires teachers and pupils to participate in the prescribed salute to the flag. For refusal to conform with the requirement the State law prescribes expulsion.
The offender is required by law to be treated as unlawfully
absent from school and the parent or guardian is made liable
to prosecution and punishment for such absence. Thus not
only is the privilege of public education conditioned on
compliance with the requirement, but non-compliance is
virtually made unlawful. In effect compliance is compulsory
and not optional.
A reluctance to interfere with considered action, the fact that the end sought is a desirable one,
the emotion aroused by the flag as a symbol for which we
have fought and are now fighting again,--all of these are
understandable. But there is before us the right of freedom
to believe, freedom to worship one's Maker according to the
dictates of one's conscience, a right which the Constitution
specifically shelters. Reflection has convinced me that as a
judge I have no loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold
that spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches."
justice Frankfurtef in an elaborate dissenting opinion amply
discloses his profound conviction, expressed in other cases which
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we have considered, that the decision of the majority dangerously
minimizes the weight that should be given to state legislation
"One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted
minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedom guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate
myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's
opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of
a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile,
neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to
the Constitution and are equally bound by our judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or
the latest immigrants to these shores. As a member of this
Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of
policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may
cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.
Most unwillingly, therefore, I must differ from my
brethren with regard to legislation like this. I cannot bring
my mind to believe that the 'liberty' secured by the Due
Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny to the
State of West Virginia the attainment of that which we all
recognize as a legitimate end, namely, the promotion of
good citizenship, by employment of the means here chosen."' 4"
"When Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for this Court,
wrote that 'it must be remembered that legislatures are
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people
in quite as great a degree as the courts,' he went to the very
essence of our constitutional system and the democratic conception of our society He did not mean that for only some
phases of civil government this Court was not to supplant
legislatures and sit in judgment upon the right or wrong
of a challenged measure. I-e was stating the comprehensive
judicial duty and role of this Court in our constitutional
scheme whenever legislation is sought to be nullified on
any ground, namely, that responsibility for legislation lies
with legislatures, answerable as they are directly to the people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is to
determine whether within the broad grant of authority vested
in legislatures they have exercised a judgment for which
reasonable justification can be offered.
"This is no dry, technical matter. It cuts deep into one's
conception of the democratic process-it concerns no less
the practical differences between the means for making these
accommodations that are open to courts and to. legislatures.
49It Is interesting to note, in view of this personal allusion, that Justice

Jackson, whose indignation at the Witnesses' attacks upon the Catholic
Church is very evident, is an Episcopalian, while Justice Murphy, whose
opimons in the cases cited breathe a spirit of marked tolerance, is a Roman
Catholic.
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A court can only strike down. It can only say 'This or that
law is void.' It cannot modify or-qualify, it cannot make
exceptions to a general requirement. And it strikes down not
merely for a day. At least the finding of unconstitutionality
ought not to have ephemeral significance unless the Constitution is to be reduced to the fugitive importance of mere legislation.
cc
Judges should be very diffident in setting their
judgment against that of a state in determining what is and
what is not a major concern, what means are appropriate to
proper ends, and what is the total social cost in striking the
balance of imponderables.
"The constitutional protection of religious freedom termnated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
religious freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from
the state, not the state may not exercise that which except
by leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal
power. Otherwise each individual could set up his own censor
against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the
public good by those whose business it is to make laws."
The majority -had distinguished Hamilton v. Regents of the
0
As to this case justice Frankfurter
UMiversity of Califorina.1
states:
"In Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, this Court
unanimously held that one attending a state-maintained unversity cannot refuse attendance on courses that offend his
religious scruples. That decision is not overruled today, but is
distinguished on the ground that attendance at the institution for higher education was voluntary and therefore a
student could not refuse compliance with its conditions and
yet take advantage of its opportunities. But West Virginia
does not compel the attendance at its public schools of the
children here concerned. West'Virgima does not so compel,
for it cannot. This court denied the right of a state to require its children to attend public schools. Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 Law Ed. 1070,
30 A. L. R. 468. 'As to its public schools, West Virginia unpoies conditions which it deems necessary in the development
of future citizens precisely as California deemed necessary
-the requirements that offended the student's conscience in
the.Hamilton Case. The need for higher education and the
duty of the state to provide it as part of a public educational
system, are part of the democratic faith of most of our
states. The right to secure such education in institutions, not
maintained by public funds is unquestioned. But the prac50(1934) 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct 197, 79 L. Ed. 343.
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tical opportunities for obtaining what is becoming in increasing measure the conventional equipment of American youth
may be no less burdensome than that which parents are
increasingly called upon to bear in sending their children to
parochial schools because the education provided by public
schools, though supported by their taxes, does not satisfy
their ethical and educational necessities. I find it impossible,
so far as constitutional power is concerned, to differentiate
what was sanctioned in the Hamilton Case from what is
nullified in this case."
He finds additional support for his position in the previous
history of the flag salute controversy in the Court. He states
"Five times has the precise question now before us been
adjudicated. Four times the Court unanimously found that
the requirement of such a school exercise was not beyond
the powers of the states. Indeed in the first three cases to
come before the Court the constitutional claim now sustained was deemed so clearly unmeritorious that this Court
dismissed the appeals for want of a substantial federal question. Leoles v. Landers, 302 U S. 656,
Herong v. State
Board of Education, 303 U S. 624,
Gabrtelliv. Kickerbocker, 306 U S. 621.
In the fourth case the judgment
of the district court upholding the state law was summarily
affirmed on the authority of earlier cases. Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U S. 621.
The fifth case, Miners'ille District
v. Gointis
was brought here because the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ran counter
to our rulings. They were reaffirmed after full consideration,
with one Justice dissenting.
"What may be even more significant than this uniform
recognition of state authority is the fact that every Justice-thirteen in all-who has hitherto participated in judging this
matter has at one or more times found no constitutional
infirmity in what is now condemned. Only the two Justices
sitting for the first time on this matter have not heretofore
found this legislation inoffensive to the 'liberty' guaranteed
by the Constitution. And among the Justices who sustained
this measure were outstanding judicial leaders in the zealous
enforcement of constitutional safeguards of civil libertiesmen like Chief justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and
Mr. Justice Cardozo, to mention only those no longer on
the Court.
"One's conception of the Constitution cannot be severed
from one's conception of a judge's function in applying it.
The Court has no reason for existence if it merely reflects
the pressures of the day Our system is built on the faith that
men set apart for this special function, freed from the influences of immediacy and from the deflections of worldly
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ambition, will become able to take a view of longer range
than the period of responsibility entrusted to Congress and
legislatures. We are dealing with matters as to which legislators and voters have conflicting views. Are we as judges
to impose our strong convictions on where wisdom lies?
That which three years ago had seemed to five successive
Courts to lie within permissible areas of legislation is now
outlawed by the deciding shift of opinion of two Justices.
What reason is there to believe that they or their successors
may not have another view a few years hence? Is that which
was deemed to be of so fundamental a nature as to be
written into the Constitution to endure tor all times to be
the sport of shifting winds of doctrine? Of course, judicial
opinions, even as to questions of constitutionality, are not
immutable. As has been true in the past, the Court will from
time to time reverse its position. But I believe that never
before has this Court changed its views so as to restrict the
powers of democratic government. Always heretofore, it has
withdrawn narrow views of legislative authority so as to
authorize what forinerly it had denied.
"In view of this history it must be plain that what thirteen
Justices found to be within the constitutional authority of a
state, legislators cannot be deemed unreasonable in enacting.
Therefore, in denying to the states what heretofore has received such impressive judicial sanction, some other tests of
unconstitutionality must surely be guiding the Court than
the absence of a rational justification for the legislation. But
I know of no other test which this Court is authorized to
apply in nullifying legislation."
The law having been found to be as decided in the Barnettc
Case, the decision in Taylor v. Misstsstppi,ii handed down the
same day, involved only the facts. The evidence was contradictory,
and the Court. adopted the proofs submitted by the State. Three
cases were considered together. A Mississippi statute, enacted in
March, 1922, made it a felony to disseminate teachings calculated
to encourage disloyalty to the government of the United States
or the State of Mississippi, or which reasonably tend to create
an attitude of stubborn refusal to.salute the flag of the United
States or the State. Taylor and another, both Jehovah's Witnesses, were convicted of violating both of these provisions, a
third member of the sect was convicted of encouraging refusal to
salute the flag. The State's evidence amply showed dissemination
of printed matter calculated to encourage refusal of the flag salute.
As to the more general charge, nothing more hostile to government is noted by the Court than the following- "All nations of
51(1943) 319 U. S. 583, 63 S. Ct. 1200, 87 L. Ed. 1600.
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the earth today are under the influence and control of tht demons.
All nations suffer the same fate or come to the same end, because all nations of earth are on the wrong side, that is, on the
losing side. All of such nations are against the Theocratic Government, that is, the government of Kingdom of Almighty God
and all are under the control of the invisible host of demons.
Therefore Satan influences public officials and others to compel
little children to indulge in idolatrous practices," etc. After the decision in the Barnette Case it was inevitable that the Court should
invalidate a statute penalizing the act of urging people to refrain
from doing that which it was unconstitutional to compel them to
do. Such was in fact the decision in the case.
The irrepressible Witnesses were again before the Court last
January in Princev. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2 A woman
was convicted of violating a Massachusetts child labor law in
permitting a nine year old child of whom she had custody to
engage with her in the street sale of Jehovah's Witness literature.
It was conceded that the statute was valid as applied to an act of
a commercial character, but claimed that under the circumstances
the child's activities were in the exercise of her religion and
therefore exempt from the prohibition of the statute. The prevailing opinion was written by Justice Rutledge, who said
"As the case reaches us, the questions are no longer open
whether what the child did was a 'sale' or an 'offer to sell'
within Sec. 69, or was 'work' within Sec. 81. The state court's
decision has foreclosed them adversely to appellant as a
Massachusetts has determined that
matter of state law
an absolute prohibition, though one limited to streets and
public places and to the incidental uses prescribe.d, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives. Its power to
attain them is broad enough to reach these peripheral instances in which the parent's supervision may reduce but
cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the prohibited conduct. We think that with respect to the public proclaiming
of religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places,
the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is
true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary
of its power has not been crossed in this case."
Justice Murphy, true to the zeal for religious liberty he has
voiced in previous opinions, dissents. He says
"The human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment
and carried over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be
52(1944) 320 U. S ....... 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed ..........
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presumed to be invulnerable, and an), attempt to*sweep away
those freedoms is prima facie invalid. It follows that any
restriction or prohibition must be justified by those who deny
The
that the freedoms have been unlawfully invaded.
reasonableness that justifies the prohibition of the ordinary
distribution of literature in the public streets by children is
not necessarily the reasonableness that justifies such a drastic
restriction when the distribution is part of their religious
faith.
The state, in my opinion, has completely failed to
sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or
immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully
protect.
The Jehovah's Witnesses are living proof of the
fact that even in this nation, conceived as it was in the ideals
of freedom, the right to practice religion in unconventional
ways is still far from secure. Theirs is a militant and unTo them,
popular faith, pursued with a fanatical zeal.
along with 6tli'i present-day religious minorities, befalls the
burden of-testing our devotion to the ideals and constitutional
guaranties of religious freedom."
justice Jackson (Justices Roberfs and Frankfurter joining)
presents-with tongue in cheek, one fancies-a dissenting opinion,
having, he says, "no alternative but to dissent from the grounds of
affirmance of a judgment which I think was rightly decided, and
upon right grounds, by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.""
Citing the Jehovah's Witnesses cases decided on May 3, 1943,
he says
"Our basic difference seems to be a5 to the method of establishing limitations which of necessity bound religious freeI think the limits begin to operate whenever
dom.
activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others
Many religious denominations or sects
or of the public.
engage in collateral and secular activities intended to obtain
means from unbelievers to sustain the worshippers and their
leaders. They raise money, not merely by passing the plate
to those who voluntarily attend services or by contributions
of their own people, but by solicitations and drives addressed
to the public.
All such money-raisig activities on a
public scale are, I thifik, Caesar's affairs and may be regulated by the state so long as it does not discriminate against
one because he is doing them for a religious purpose, and
the -regulation is not arbitrary and capricious, in violation
of other provisions of the Constitution. The Court in the
The Court now
Mirdock Case rejected this principle.
draws a line based on age that cuts across both true exercise
of religion and auxiliary secular activities. I think this is not
a correct principle for defining the activities immune from
53.(1943) 313 Mass. 223, 46 N. E. (2d) 755.
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regulation on grounds of religion, and Murdock overrules
the grounds on which I think affirmance should rest."
It is plain that present constitutional guaranties of personal
liberty, as authoritatively interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, are far broader than they were before the spring of
1938, and that most of this enlargement is to be found in the
thirty-one Jehovah's Witnesses cases (sixteen deciding opinions)
of which Lovell v City of Griffin was the first. If "the blood of
the martyrs is the seed of the Church," what is the debt of Constitutional Law to the militant persistency-or perhaps I should
say devotion-of this strange group? The reader has the material
,in these pages. Let a bolder man than the present writer undertake
to reduce it to legal syllabi. Has the right of a religious group to
propagate its faith reached its limit?5 4 Or will. Justice Murphy's
view yet prevail?
. 4 The question was answered in the negative while this article was in
the hands of the printer. In Follett v. Town of McCormick, (1944) ......
U. S ........
64 S. Ct. 714, 88 L. Ed ........
the Court went beyond any of its
previous positions in holding immune from an occupational license fee a
distributor of Jehovah's Witness literature operating in his home town
and depending on his distribution thereof for his livelihood. The prevailing
opinion was written by Justice Douglas. Justices Reed and Murphy concurred in separate opinions, the former with evident reluctance aid under
the compulsion of the decisions in the Murdock and Jones Cases. Justices
Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson dissented, expressing much alarm at what
they hold to be the implications of the prevailing view.

